Energy Insecurity, Conflict, and the Role of New Technologies

Introduction

Generally perceived as the availability, affordability and accessibility of energy, energy security is becoming a pillar of both economic and political stability in the contemporary world. Current research highlights that these aspects are interrelated, and availability preconditions a physical supply, affordability preconditions the economical access, and reliability preconditions the resilience of the systems (Masood et al., 2023). Nevertheless, the idea is debated and situation-specific as it indicates a larger socio-political and technological processes within the regions (Siksnelyte-Butkiene, 2023). Energy insecurity in the form of disruptions in supply chain, fluctuations in the price, or vulnerability of the infrastructure has acquired increased international significance due to the geopolitical pressure, climate crises, and market uncertainty (Siksnelyte-Butkiene, 2023).

Most importantly, energy insecurity may serve as a triggering factor in the occurrence of an armed conflict as it heightens inter states rivalry over the limited resources, increases reliance on imports, and aggravates inner political turmoil. The presence of resources in a particular territory can turn into the object of geopolitical tension, and the surge in energy prices can lead to economic crises and social unrest, which effectively become the examples of how energy becomes the so-called threat multiplier and not the only source of conflict (Tete et al., 2023). This, however, is not a fixed relationship; other scholars maintain that a process of interdependence in trading energy can also result in cooperation and mutual restraint. This dynamic is further complicated by the advent of new energy technologies, especially renewables. Decentralised energy systems on the one hand can eliminate dependence on unstable markets in fossil fuels as well as alleviate geopolitical tensions; on the other hand, it can lead to new areas of weakness, such as competition in access to essential minerals, reliance on technologies (Tol, 2023). This essay thus discusses the various types of energy as sources of greater security threats, the complex relationships between energy and militarisation, the policy effects created by securitisation and the manner in which new technologies are changing the energy security landscape.

Why Energy Source Matters for States

The selection of energy sources is a life-and-death factor of state security since it defines the relationship between energy independence and interdependence with a lot of geopolitical and economic changes. States that heavily depend on imported energy are structurally susceptible to disruptions in supply, political interventions, and outside shocks, especially when just a few suppliers are involved in their dependence (De Rosa et al., 2022). This dynamic is demonstrated by empirical evidence in the European Union, where the high import dependency has been found to have a negative impact on general energy security and lead to an exposure to external risks (De Rosa et al., 2022). On the other hand, when the energy-exporting states can experience short-term economic benefits, they are likely to experience fiscal instability in the long run due to their reliance on unstable international markets, which in turn confirms the paradox noted that both importing/importing countries are equally vulnerable, but in different ways (Streimikiene et al., 2023).

Energetically, geopolitically regions tend to turn into strategic hotspots, which increases the competition and possibility of conflict or pressure-coercion diplomacy. The European gas crisis is a clear case example of how dependence on a single supplier can be weaponised when Russia chose to disregard the usual gas flow to reveal structural vulnerability of the European energy framework and increased political tensions (Wolff and Gritz, 2022). In the same respect, the level of concentration of fossil fuel supplies in politically fragile areas supports the strategic significance of supply ways well as alliances. Nevertheless, interdependence can also lead to cooperation since the need to be mutually reliant can create the incentive to maintain trade data, which presents the idea that energy dependence is not necessarily destabilising, but it is contextually dependent (Wolff and Gritz, 2022).

The dynamics of economy energy prices stability also continue to be at the center of interest since any fluctuations may catalyse inflation and affect the performance of industries, not to mention the social instability. The effects and localisability of energy shocks are demonstrated by the 20212022 energy price explosion in Europe, which was marked by explosive gas prices, a rapid transition to economy-wide eventual instability (Misik, 2022). Policymakers in turn have continued to focus on diversification policies, as Mišík (2022) claims, they need consistent and coherent external energy policies and diversification of their supplies as a way to reduce systemic risks and increase resilience. However, diversification in itself can cause new dependencies, e.g. on liquefied natural gas or other suppliers, proving that energy security is not about removing dependency but about being able to balance it in a strategic manner.

Types of Energy and Their Security Concerns

The various sources of energy have differentiated security threats based on their distribution of resources, their technological attributes, and the integration to the global markets. The fossil-based energy consumption is the most geopolitically sensitive since it is concentrated in certain areas and reliant on unprotected transport systems (Mayer, 2022). This monopoly encourages cross-border competition and leaves fossil fuel chains vulnerable to destabilisation, while empirical evidence demonstrates that the dependency on fossil fuels has a strong relationship with the so-called resource curse, which increases the level of governance failures and internal conflict (Mayer, 2022). Furthermore, fossil fuel infrastructures are also extremely vulnerable to price fluctuations and geopolitical crises, and a recent series of crises has seen the world energy markets spreading the risk internationally and destabilise the national economies (Zhou et al., 2025).

Conversely, nuclear energy has a unique arrangement of security issues that is founded on the technical sophistication and political delicacy as opposed to lack of resources. Although nuclear power contributes to increased supply security, fewer reliance on imported fossil fuels, it increases the risk of acute proliferation, especially in situations where civilian programmes and military ambitions can be colliding (Szulecki and Overland, 2023). Recent commentaries point to the fact that the very issue of nuclear energy diplomacy could become a geopolitical instrument of its own, instilling interdependences over the long-term between provider and consumer states (Szulecki and Overland, 2023). Also due to high prices of safety infrastructure, probability of catastrophic accidents (low but high impact) and the dual aspect of nuclear energy as stabilising but at the same time destabilising factor in national security systems, nuclear energy has a high likelihood of potential catastrophes (Gitelman et al., 2023).

Solar, wind and hydropower are renewable sources of power, which are often discussed as an energy source that increases energy security by decentralising and decreasing the dependence on imported energy. Evidence exists suggesting that renewables have the potential not only to mitigate geopolitical risk related to tradition but also increase resilience through diversified supply systems (Foss, 2022). However, it should also be noted that an increasing share of this optimism is tempered by the reality that other equally important minerals, such as lithium and cobalt, become increasingly vulnerable, given their mining and refinement becoming geographically concentrated or politically mineral resource-sensitive (Kotarska and Young, 2023). With that, although renewables might reduce direct conflict risks over fossil fuel, they present novel types of economic and geopolitical interdependence, which confirms the thesis that energy transitions are changing and not ending security challenges.

How Energy Insecurity Can Lead to Armed Conflict

The roles of energy insecurity in the causes of armed conflict are interconnected and take place in more than one way, especially where the interstate relations are characterised by competition on scarce and/or strategic resources (Denly et al., 2022). Oil and gas fields, particularly in disputed maritime areas or on the border areas will imply that there will always be geopolitical competition as states strive to access and control the important reserves of energy. Empirical studies indicate that factors that lead to perceived insecurity in the access to resources are a major predisposing factor to interstate conflicts especially when there is a fear of disrupted supply or lack of access to energy networks (Denly et al., 2022). In addition to the Russia Ukraine war, geopolitical events show how energy dependence might lead to increased tension, as well as reorder strategic partnerships, further confirming the mutual interaction between energy insecurity and international conflicts (NBER, 2024).

On the intrastate level, poor institutional framework is combined with socioeconomic disparity leading to civil conflict caused by energy insecurity. Insecure governance, corruption, and lack of transparency in the distribution of energy revenues in resource-rich states represent one of the main factors behind their instability and are explained by the resource curse thesis (Alam et al., 2025).It has been quantitatively demonstrated that both internal and external conflict substantially inflame energy insecurity and at the same time are strengthened by instability, signaling the existence of a mutually strengthening association between instability and resource dependency (Khalid et al., 2024). In addition, due to the energy deficit and destruction of infrastructure in conflicts, poverty and social resentment are further intensified, which creates the conditions in the environment that sustains violence and foundation (Khalid et al., 2024).

The other pivotal process of interaction between energy insecurity and conflict is economic instability where price fluctuations and supply shocks may lead to inflation and joblessness as well as general social discontent (Koirala et al., 2025). The global crisis of recent past has shown the speed with which the energy price shocks spread through economies destabilising politics, and intensifying tensions in societies. Meanwhile, states can also weaponise energy as a form of coercion, through supply reduction or price manipulation to attain strategic goals (Koirala et al., 2025). Although these practices underscore the fact that energy is currently central to contemporary geopolitics, one should note that energy insecurity is seldom a single cause of war, but instead, only exacerbates underlying political, economic, and social weaknesses (Koirala et al., 2025).

Energy Security and Its Intersection with Other Security Dimensions

Economic and National Security

Energy security is related to economic and national security because states depend on energy. Energy is more than just a material input because it determines industrial production, household well-being, public finance and the legitimacy of government. As Alam, Nakhaee, and Yilmazkuday (2025) note, energy security shock is a threat to economic development, especially where price spikes and uncertainties are enhanced by geopolitical factors. This is because energy insecurity increases costs of production, limits policy options available to government, as well as adds to the pressures that exist at times of high inflation. Similar views are presented by Mišík (2022), who explains how reliance on imported energy supply proved to be a burden in times of gas price shocks in Europe. It turns out that national security is affected, because military operations, police, digital infrastructure and transportation all depend on the energy infrastructure. Liwång (2023) explains that future energy systems have to be assessed holistically in defense. The key argument is that energy security is a material underpinning for economic resilience and coercion.

Environmental, Human and Cybersecurity Dimensions

Energy insecurity also links environmental, human and cyber security through various cascading vulnerabilities. Climate change is exacerbated by fossil-fuel use, and energy is then put in danger by climate change through heatwaves, flooding and damage to infrastructure. Elkhatat and Al-Muhtaseb (2024) point out that energy policy now needs to consider security, equity and sustainability, rather than as distinct goals. Wang and Azam (2024) also note that scarcity of natural resources, fossil-fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions mutually reinforce one another in high-polluting economies. Human security is also crucial since energy poverty limits access to heat, cooling, telephony, education and livelihoods. Streimikiene and Kyriakopoulos (2023) associate energy poverty with the justice issues in unequal low-carbon transitions. Halkos and Aslanidis (2023) also demonstrate the link between multidimensional energy poverty and sustainable development. Also, digitalisation leads to cyber vulnerability because smart grids, controls for oil and gas pipelines and power markets rely on networks. Alomari et al. (2025) show smart grids are critical infrastructures vulnerable to intrusions, data manipulations and disruptions. Abraham, Houmb and Erdodi (2025) demonstrate that cyberattacks on oil and electricity infrastructure have broader social impacts, beyond the technical consequences. Therefore, energy security should be considered a holistic governance issue, rather than a supply issue.

Securitisation of Energy

Securitisation of energy occurs when political elites downgrade energy supply disruptions to “the ultimate threat”. Securitisation of energy, according to Wilson (2019), is a dynamic political process whereby governments frame energy risks as a survival threat that demands action. This is helpful, as it accounts for the variability in policy responses to identical supply issues. For instance, a gas scarcity can be treated as a market failure, a geopolitical issue or a security threat, depending on political circumstances and interests. For example, as Kuzemko et al. (2022) demonstrate, the Russian invasion of Ukraine prompted European energy policy to go into emergency mode, with priorities including speeding up diversification and refocusing on affordability. However, securitisation is an analytically ambiguous term because it can increase mobilisations but decrease accountability. If politicians treat energy as a permanent crisis, they may use secret deals, subsidies to existing industries or increased energy sector centralisation to gain political control. Member states’ defence of national interests can undermine external energy policy, Mišík (2022) warns. Thus, the benefit of securitisation is assessed based on its impact on resilience versus short-term political actions. The question is not energy’s security relevance, but the impact of security language.

Impact of New Energy Technologies

Conflict-Reducing Effects

New energy technologies can help avoid some of the risks of conflict by diversifying supply and fossil-fuel chokepoints. Solar, storage, electrification and demand management may increase energy security by decreasing imports from high-risk regions. Vo, Ho and Lang (2025) show that green finance supports energy security in geopolitical risk situations if it facilitates decarbonisation and diversification. This means that technology is not necessarily pacifying, since security depends on finance, institutions and interconnections. Qiu, Wang and Wei (2023) demonstrate that natural disasters have a complex impact on energy security, so distributed systems need to be climate-resilient as well. Regardless, decentralised solar, storage and grids will diminish the importance of single pipelines, ports and choke points. The technologies can also enhance human security in remote regions where extending the grid is expensive. The most significant impact is therefore not the prevention of conflict, but the reduction of vulnerable points of energy flows, which have historically posed military and diplomatic risks.

New Sources of Tension

The technological revolution introduces new resources, manufacturing and IT vulnerabilities. Critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper and rare earth elements are highly concentrated and extremely concentrated when refined. Smith (2023) notes that energy transition supply chains present both risks and opportunities on energy security as clean technologies are dependent on a handful of suppliers. Saadaoui, Smyth and Vespignani (2025) also show that geopolitical risk affects prices of critical minerals, hence linking mineral markets to clean-energy security. Therefore, while renewable energy could address the issue of fuel imports, mineral embargoes, mineral processing bottlenecks and industrial policy competition may become a problem. There is also a technology-import issue, as countries may be dependent on other countries for batteries, solar panels, inverters, software and grid. Alomari et al. (2025) note that the smart-grid deployment exposes the system to cyber-attacks, without governance and technical protections. Therefore, new technologies transform the sites of energy competition from wells and pipelines to mines, factories, standards and data centres. The transition therefore changes tools of energy control, rather than removing them.

Energy Transition Risks

The energy transition may risk destabilising fossil-fuel economies by causing sudden revenue losses. Heras and Gupta (2024) highlight the justice, development and governance concerns for the Global South from stranded assets that are ignored in transition analysis. This is important as fossil-fuel exporters could experience revenue, job, exchange rate and social impacts due to declining fossil-fuel demand. Kuzemko et al. (2022) also show security responses in crises can thwart sustainability and justice. Thus, a constricted transition strategy might lead to insecurity by providing consumer protection in importing countries at the cost of workers, exporters or resource communities in other nations. By contrast, a neutral strategy may be diversification, social safety nets, industrial transformation and mineral governance. Smith (2023) emphasises that supply-chain security is a design, not a technology issue. In short, new technologies reduce some of the fossil-fuel risks but they also require active management to avoid new forms of dependency, exclusion and coercion.

Balanced Evaluation

A balanced assessment should view energy transitions as a risk-shifting, rather than replacement, process. Green technologies eliminate some fossil-fuel risks, such as imports, carbon lock-in and marine fuel supply chains. But they need new kinds of industrial capacity, mineral security, cyber security and affordability policies. Liwång (2023) suggests that in the future, energy systems should be integrated into holistic defence because energy policies of the civil sector influence the national security. Streimikiene and Kyriakopoulos (2023) show that in the absence of affordability and access interventions, a low-carbon energy transition can exacerbate energy poverty. Vo, Ho and Lang (2025) discover that green finance mitigates security risks by investing in less risky and diversified energy systems. Ekhatat and Al-Muhtaseb (2024) also emphasize the importance of policy coordination as a key to integrating climate mitigation and energy security. The takeaway is that technology can enhance security if institutions address affordability, supply chains, cyber security and equity. Otherwise, security measures can be inequitable, politically volatile and socially divisive.

Conclusion

Energy insecurity makes the greatest contribution to conflict when combined with other security factors. It can slow economic growth, undermine national resilience, exacerbate climate change risks, exacerbate energy poverty and make energy infrastructure vulnerable to cyber-attack. Securitisation reveals governments’ political framing of energy security, rather than their response to objective scarcity. However, this lens has to be handled with care because the security discourse can enlist strategic planning – or be used to exercise excessive control. It is demonstrated it in Europe where the reliance on foreign suppliers of energy required greater coordination but also pointed out the constraints of national energy policy. The new energy technologies are a solution to this issue as they employ renewables, storage and electrification to reduce the risk of fossil-fuel blackmail and transportation bottlenecks. Conversely, it also poses other risks associated with critical minerals, digital platforms, supply-chain monopolies and stranded assets. The study shows indicate that these expenses are especially sharp in the case of fossil-fuel economies whose economic development is uncertain. It is noted that critical minerals prices are already influenced by geopolitical risk, which confirms that future energy wars may still occur. Hence, the best evidence is that energy security needs to be managed as an economic, political, environmental and technological challenge.

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